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FOUCAULT'S BODY
"Ni mort ni vivant, non encore enterr6 mais 'sans oeuvre' -- le
magnifique mot de Foucault pour d6signer la folie : disparu. "
(Althusser 19)
Imagine a body, the body of the other lying in front of you.
Through your perspective, by dint of your situation in the space you
occupy, you have determined focus, gaze, vision. You have decided what
is in your purview. Imagine that body neither alive nor dead, neither
moving nor inert, defined neither as a corps nor as a corpse. Try to
imagine it. It is someone, it belongs to someone, or perhaps it belonged
to someone. To decide whose body it is, we must know if it is alive, if it
is a subject, or the effect of a subject, or if it is purely and simply an
object, just there, belonging to no one in particular. Belonging to someone
else. Who does the body belong to when it is a corpse? It is an odd
question, for in our time we thillk or believe that a human cannot belong
to anyone else. We think or believe that the body is sovereign and
specifically, that my body is mine. But when the corps becomes a corpse,
we DO longer know to whom it belongs. Is it, like some other inert chattel
or object, the property of the inheritors, the legatees? Can one will one's
body to be the property of another? Seemingly one can, and yet, no
sooner belonging to someone else, the body is more often than not cast
off, buried, burnt, discarded.
The body of an other is an object that one wants only as long as
that other, defined as some sensate being inhabiting or imprisoned within
that body, is still resident. Once that soul, being, or heart is gone, once
that body is only a body, no one wants it. The remains of the other cannot
be his or her body, cannot be a body belonging to someone else.
Necrophiliacs beware: you want what is willed to an other which that
other does not want. Your desire is false, aberrant, unseemly, inhuman,
because you do not desire according to the law of desire: you desire what
no one desires .
To think of the body before it is categorized as living or dead
means to rethink or to unthink a whole set of categories. Just for a
moment, eliminate the thorny question of the subject, if only because the
body has no necessarily resident subject. Perhaps the subject is only an
effect of a subject, as tleeting in one wayas it is evanescent in another:
when the body is reduced to being the absolute object to be traversed,
crisscrossed, barred, imprisoned by the discourses , powers, and grids that
fix it, when that body has become an absolute prisoner of solitary
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confinement, the effect of subject is gone.
So tbink tben of the body ne;lher livingnor dead or bOlh livingand
dead. Imagine that body, think of it in your mind. See it then before you.
To see tbat body, to gaze on that body is to rnake it yours, to appropriate
tbat body for yourself. Living or dead, tbat body becomes the object of
your gaze, the object of your coveting gaze, the appropriated thing that you
now possess. You have watched tbe body of the other, you have made it
yours, rightly or wrongly, you have gazed upon it. To conceive of it is to
look at it, to possess it with your eyes. You have assumed tbe sadistic
position. In your mind, you do with it what you will.
Consider the position in which you stand to look at the patient,
the position you take to decide who is sane and who is crazy, the position
you assume to look at a painting of some ladies in waiting. You dominate
with your gaze: lying there Iifeless or squirming from the torturous look
by wbicb you control her or hirn witb your vision, the other becomes
subject(ed) to your thought, politics, action, and discourse. Tbe discourse
of power translated into and translating your gaze confirms you as tbe
master of what you survey. But wait, for you too are in discourse, subject
to tbe same language; you think you bave the independence of a subject,
the liberty or disponibilile of a free agent. Yet you are incapable of
creating a position that is yours alone. YOllr mind and your body are
subject to some other; you too are captive in a web or grid of discourse to
which you are the tacitly assenting party. Wait again: wbat is at the
center of wbat you see is not that subjected subject, captive of the grid.
As you look into the center, you see yourself: you do not see the patient
but tbe discourses you have proffered; you do not see the boy you love,
subjected to your whims, but the logos describing what you can do, the
same logos that you have appropriated for yourself (Usage 100-03). Vou
do not see the redoubled reflection of something already there, but your
own eyes, the eyes of the king that are now your eyes, the eyes of an
absolute subject overcoming your own imprisonment by the retumed
reflection of your vision (MOlS 24-25).
Look tben as Foucault looks. Share the scene of the body (of
another, of bimself as other) that he puts before you, as if it were his to
give. And then and only then, look at his body to see if you too have
appropriated a position as I suggest. Foucault's study of the prison opens
with what has become a famous description of the body of a condemned
prisoner wbo in 1757 is put to death by being bumed and then drawn and
quartered (Surveiller 9). The public spectacle of torture, of supplice, the
torture not to extract information, but tbe torture unto death, is a
performance wherein the actor is always already the body that is neither
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living Ror dead or botb living and dead. Subject to the covetous view of
the other, of all the others, the condemned prisoner is the figure of the
common whore, belonging to all, subject to all possessive gazes, forced to
go in every direction by the ones that have power over her or hirn. The
body of the prisoner, usually male, is feminized by the power of the
observer, sadistically and heterosexually male.
Not castration so much as the vision of a forced heterosexuality.
To avoid the mimesis of the justly condemned homosexual position
wherein the male looks at and possesses the corps, corpse of the male
other, the prisoner becomes a woman, deprived ofpower, ofphallic center,
of an ability to move or to be. Sade--for his name has a1ready appeared--
is injudicious, obscene, improper in that he does not sublimate or disguise
that homosexual position in a heterosexual maske
Tbe eighteenth century that Foucault chooses as one of his
privileged objects of study knows that order must be maintained. Tbe
male subject can look; the female subject must either be subjected, looked
at, or, on occasion, may look away. But in no way can 5he look. Plate 29
of Surveiller el punir is an engraving from the end of the eighteenth
century. It features a steam-run machine for the "correction" of little girls
and boys. It seems to have a set of "verges"and "fouets" that are used to
spank the children as Mr. Croquemitaine and Mme Briquabrac supervise.
Interestingly enougb, tbe adult male looks on, whereas the adult female is
facing away from the machine and the supplicating child.
Tbe nineteenth century universalizes that male position of vision
and gaze while removing the direct use of power involved in the supplice.
Am I wrong to suggest that this position is still a sadistic one, still a
sexually sadistic one, and still a homosexual one? To look at the prisoner
without kill~ng hirn, to make your gaze the universal eye watehing the other
is to desire according to the eyes of male vision, to make every position a
homosexual sadistic one. Rene Girard, following Heget, is right: if desire
is effectuated according to the desire of another, Le., if I as a male desire
a woman, it is because another male already desires her. Thus for Girard,
desire is fundamentally homosexual. If then, in the world of Foucauldian
vision, I possess the other with my eyes, it is because I have imprisoned
hirn in tbe structures of male dominance. The sodomy for which prisons
are unjustly famous is a redundance of the homosexual possession that the
other makes of tbe body of the prisoner.
Foucault speaks of nothing else. Whether it is the creation of the
medical gaze as the corpus of symptoms is created, or the invention of
man, whether it is the effect of the subject imprisoned in discourses of
general knowledge or the actual imprisonment of the body in a cell into
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whieh the eyes of the other ean always penetrate, the diseourse of Foucault
repeats endlessly that the universal position, at least from the nineteenth
eentury on, is one that is botb bomosexual and sadistie. The body of the
other becomes the mutilated corps or corpse of Saint Sebastian, gay icon
par excellence: "During 'the classical era, there was a whole discovery of
the body as the object and target cihle] of power" (Surv. 138).
Foucault relates 'lhe transformation of the body as an object for
penology in whieh the "body itself is invested with the relations of power"
(28) to the concept of the "king's two bodies" developed by Ernst
Kantorowitz. Speeifically, Kantorowitz considers that in the body of the
king, there is both the transitory element of the individual who is born and
dies and the transeendent element of the king that remains throughout
time. Similarly, Foucault suggests that the "condemned prisoner is marked
as the symmetrical and inverse figure of the king" (33). Thus, Foucault
suggests, along with the body itself, there is a double, an incorporeal "soul"
produced by punishment. This soul, unlike the Christian soul, is the loeus
where knowledge and power meet, "the effect and instrument of a political
anatomy" and tbe "prison of the body" (34).
We might eonsider this soul then as the heterosexual construct,
the "effeet of the subject" within the struetures of a homosexual and
ftdistic model. If the subject constructed by the discourses of society is
presumed on the surface to be a heterosexual one, it is only after the
intemalization of the diseourses of dominanee. That is to say, one ean
become a fietionally -free subjeet in this soeiety of dominance and exchange
by buying into the position of the discourses of power, by ingesting them,
by intemalizing them. One becomes a subject by eating the words of the
father, by aeeepting that the consequenees of tbe so-ealled Oedipal model
of capitalism are aceession to a position of power by bomosexually
ingesting the Other of power and by passing oneself off thereafter as
heterosexual.
Imagine a body, the body of an author. The body sileneed in a
way, a gag in his mouth, so that, puppet of the discourses of power he
silently repeats the discourses of the other as he stiftes through the gag:
"What matter who's speaking?" ("What Is an Author?" in Language 138).
Bound and gagged, the author disappears behind the text, behind the
effects of a subject ereated, foreed at that spot to perform as if it were a
subject. What better retreat from being forced into a position where not
only one's tongue is tied, but also one's body, than to pretend that the very
body is not there. With no body there, there is neither corps nor corpse.
With no body there, the spaee marked by no subject and no vietim seems
the uniform spaee of ascetieism. In Foucault's writing, what eould be
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loosely termed an ascetic approach to writing takes the form of the
disappearance of the writer from the text. This disappearance is double,
not the single one that we would normally predict of the writer's
consciousness. For it is also the author's body that disappears from the
work. That body will come back with a bang toward the end of his life, as
he realizes the fundamental importance of his body for his text. As Miller
(261) notes, quoting Leo Bersani: h 'There was something explosive about
his fascination,' recalls Leo Bersani, 'I mean, the scene was fun--but it
wasn't thaI much fun!'" But before his body appears, can there be any
doubt that he has to make it appear from within the walls of a Piranesian
cell: "And while 1was doing this project, 1noticed that it was not working
out. An important problem remained: why had we made sexuality into
a moral experience? So I locked myself up, abandoned everything I had
wrilten on the seventeenth century, and started to work my way back... It
("The Return of Morality" in Politics 252).
It is thus understandable to find Foucault using a present tense
that has a deictic component in the second volume of Histoire de la
sexl/alile. Whereas the atemporal present, the habitual tense for scientific
enquiry, is a commonplace, a temporal present is a rare occurrence in his
writing. The presence of the present tense is not only as the traces of an
enunciative presence of mind, but also that of the body of the author:
To say dtings quite schematically: we tend today to think that the
practices of pleasure, when they occur between two partners of the
same sex, relate to adesire whose structure is particular; but we admit-
-if we are "tolerant"--that this is not a reasoß to submit titern to a
morality [mora/tl, eveß Jess to JegisJation, different from the one
common to everyone. The point of our inlerrogation, we bring it to
bear on the singularity of adesire that is not addressed to the other
sex; and at the same time, we affinn that one must not accord to this
type of relations the least value, nor reserve for it a particular status.
(Usage 212-13).
No body, dead or alive, flayed or left whole, occupies the phantom
locus. No subjection to the dualism of Christian and capitalist order need
interfere with the production of text or the realization of power grids.
Dualism disappears, as does the division of soul and body, for without a
body, the soul has no horne. In L'Usage des plaisirs (74), Foucault
contrasts Christian interiority with classical exteriority. 80th imply a
process of self-correction and self-work, but from vastly different
perspectives. In Christian interiority, there is a "particular mode of
relation to oneself that includes precise forms of attention, suspicion,
dechiffrement, verbalization, admission [aveu] , self-accusation, stroggle
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against temptation, renuneiation, spiritual combat, ete." (74). But the
exteriority of classical moral relates to a set of external mies observed and
followed, though without any interiorization of those roles.
And yet there is a body. At least a body is projected as a fantasy
at the locus of the all commanding, sadistic other: "I believe the great
fantasy is the idea of a social body eonstituted by the universality of wills"
("Body/Power" in Power 55). There must be a body, but that universal
body is a fantasy. It is the projection of some single position, some single
sadistic other; it exists; Foueault knows it; is it any wonder then that the
body of the subject returns? For the sadistic position to function, it
requires fodder, meat, a body on which to operate.
No, perhaps the ascetic position is better, a position without a
body: "Yet a fact is there: in a few dozen years what disappeared was the
tortured, dismembered, amputated body, symbolically marked on the face
or shoulder, exposed live or dead, given in spectacle" (Surveiller 14). No
body is on stage on which to operate, no body need be present behind the
words of the discourse that insists on the neutrality of its position, 1 would
say, the singular neutrality of its position. Neither masculine nor feminine,
neither heterosexual nor homosexual , the transmitter of discourse does not
have to decide for himself, can eclipse himself from the stage, as observer
and body alike disappear. If there is no body to punish, if there is no
observer to categorize, tbe neutral disembodied observer can move from
focusing on the repressive effects of discourse to seeing aseries of positive
effects (Surveiller 28). Neutrality means that one does not have to say,
decide, or be, one can be moved off one's invisible mark, neither presence
nor absence, neither alive nor dead. And that any movement, in any
direction is a positive step.
Not saying one is gay, not having to say one is gay, pretending, not
that one is not gay, but that that position ean be a neutral one, this is the
ascetic ideal in text. Or at least in some texts, for in Foucault's writing,
there is both the espousal of a position of neutrality and, in seleet spots,
a presentation of the position of a gay individual different from the
scientific, neutral position often seen in the writing. There are two
possibilities then. Tbe first is that the position of the individual caught in
discourse and transmitting that discourse can be neutral, and that,
specifically, the definition assigned by the general episteme to the genders
of knowledge can be easily evacuated. In other words, there seems to be
a belief in much of Foucault' s writing that the marked position of
transmitter of knowledge, which is white, male, heterosexual, can easily be
neutralized.
Dut there is another position, a position that allows that the sexual
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position is an irreducible one, that despite all the sense of the social
structuring of the sexual position, there is an irreducible mark or moment
that cannot be (a)voided. Tbe gay position is always there, not as a variant
of the heterosexual position, not as an opposition to it, but as a difference
from it. And it follows then that the neutral position eonstructed at the
point of discourse is necessarily different from the other neutral position,
the evacuated heterosexual position. That neither then is truly neutral and
is always marked by the gendered, sexual signs of discourse and behavior
remains eminently clear as weil. To be gay is to realize that there is
another history,another discourse that is not so easily neutralized.
It also means that there are perhaps two versions of the same
history , for example, the history of homosexuality, two versions of the same
social construction, that do not neeessarily correspond except in their
surface phenomena. Take for example, the tentative, neutral,
dispassionate, seientifie deseription of pederasty, the love of boys that
comes to the fore in the second and third volumes of L'Histo;re de La
sexualite. Now in part, Foucault needs to deal with what amounts to one
of the great taboos of the contemporary Western world. And at least
implicitly, the movement from exteriority to interiority brings about the
eomplete repression of the possibility of the love for boys. Yet if
Foucault's model and epistemological system are correet, the so-called
repression of the love of boys, the construction of a taboo is not part of a
repression per se but aetually a means of channeling that same structure
of desire. Hence Foucault's discussion of the love of boys must proceed
delicately in order not to seem to be shaking the foundations of the taboo.
Now I would hypothesize that the fundamental ambiguity at the
heart of Foucault's work relates to this sexual question. And we must ask
ourselves how that ambiguity plays itself out. .Does, for example, the fact
that Foucault is gay have importance for how we read the text? Some
would say 'that it has everything to do with it. On the other hand, some
would say that while perhaps aneedotally interesting, Foucault's
homosexuality in and of itself does not have much of an influence.
Foueault's position could be described as the absence of heterosexuality,
it eould be explained as being different from heterosexuality. But it could
also be articulated as that from which a heterosexual position is different.
A slight rhetorical move perhaps, but an important one. It matters what
is defined first. Tbe question is not "What matter who's talking?tt but
"What matter who talks first?" More precisely, if homosexuality is never
defined as secondary to heterosexuality, then our perspective on the whole
matter changes considerably.
In his biography of Foucault, Didier Eribon seems to consider
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implicitly or explicitly that the world of the reader is defined as being
heterosexual, or at least that heterosexuality is the benchmark by which we
read. As late as 1989, Eribon (12) is hedging his bet by saying that he
envisages a general public for whom there is a "scandal still constituted
today by the evocation of homosexuality." Eribon conceives of two
possible sets of readers, those who might feel that he bas said too much
about the subject of homosexuality and those who regret "the absence of
details or picturesque descriptions, on American life, for example" (12).
He allows that he is more sympathetic to the laUer, but that he does not
want to shock the former. And it is tbis so-called American life, with its
implicit freedorn, abandon, and even danger that Eribon evokes atthe end
of the book as weil: "Foucault's American happiness: the reconciliation
with himself fina1ly realized. He is happy in his work. He is happy in the
pleasures of the body.... But it is precisely there that the new plague was
beginning to spread out its odious ravages" (338).
It is not at a11 "American life It on which the details are lacking, but
rather "Foucault'sgay life." Understandably so, from a legal point ofview,
for going much beyond the simple statement of fact could possibly have
100 to a libel suit against Eribon, since it would seem that it is in fact
defamatory to go into detail about an individual's homosexuality. Though
not subject to the same libel laws, Miller announces the same lack of
information: ttWhat exact1y Foucault did in San Francisco in the fall of
1983--and why--may never be known tt (29). We shall return to the
dangerous implications of this black box of non-knowledge below.
Eribon's position is a safe one. He discusses Foucault's
homosexuality from the point of view of the dispassionate, yet sympathetic
reader who has adopted a view that sees the normative heterosexual
position as the central one. Foucault's homosexuality must be understood
as different from what is accepted by the dominant discourse, and when
it is just one mode among others, it is not worth mentioning:
[... ]1 decided to tell the facts, in their reality, when they had to be told
to uoderstand such and such an event, such and such an aspect of the
career, work, thought, life--death--of Foucault. I passed over them
silendy when they concemed only the secret territory that each aod
every person amnges in his own existence. (12)
So we could say that from the outset, Eribon's position seems
unconsciously to mime the dualistic one that Foucault has set out for
bimself. On the ODe hand, there is a gay body, undeniably there, at the
center of the crossroads. The effect of the subject produces the gay body
because it is perceived as such, and swathes it in a set pf discourses that
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define it as the gay body. On 'the other hand, there are times when,from
the point 0/ view 0/ the dominant discourse,there is no need to mention the
question of being gay, for it is restricted to a secret territory.
Where is this secret territory? Is it some recess of the mind safe
from the dominant discourses that fonn the effect of the subject, that
determine when and where something Iike a subject will corne into ptaee?
One would think then that the secret territory is some area, some
imprisoned area safe from and impervious to the discourses of dominance.
Where does this territory speak? Does it have its own tanguage? And yet,
even that Foucauldian impossibility seems to pale in comparison to the
more general question of universality: every one of us has such a territory.
If this is a universal, not only is there a set of discrete idioms and praxes
relating to that territory, but moreover that territory is part of a universal
set. We are alt sexual beings, Eribon seems to be saying, regardless of the
homo.. or hetero- twist to the particular individual.
Despite the seeret yet universal nature of the territory,there is a
name for it, and Eribon speils the name out of that territory in the very
first pages: America. Yes, in fact, it is the description of the picturesque
aspects of American life that is missing for Eribon, because America is the
fulfillment of the pleasure principle:
For Michel Foucault, the United States is the pleasure of work. Hut
it is also just pleasure. He tastes the liberty that exists in New York
or in an Francisco, with their homosexual neighborhoods. where there
is a flowering of magazines and newspapers. bars. and nightclubs... The
gay community is uncountable, organized. and firmly decided to impose
its rights. And also--this is not without importance--, the United States
is a country where homosexuality is not marked by an age limit, by the
severely defined criteria of youth. (336)
Thus one version of the story presents an idealized exteriorizing of an
America where everything is possible, where there is a freeplay of sexual
choices and sexual acts. It is an America that beckons, like a gay utopian
paradise in which alt acts somehow are possible, in which new games and
new pleasures await. America is the pleasurable tenitory in which the
body is not subjected to the arrest of discourse, where there is a flow of
energies that is both a testament to an aet of sexual liberation and a will
to power. Certainly, as Lawrence Kritzman points out in his introduction
to his collection Polit;cs, Philosophy, Culture, commenting on Foucault's
concept of homosexuality:
Gay sexuality is to be thought of as a dynamic mode in which the
refusal of a more traditional lifestyle emanates from a sexual choice
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that transfonns one's own mode of being; sexuality should be used to
experiment, to invent new relations in which desire is problematized in
a world of polymorphous perversions. For according to Foucault the
ideology of sexual liberation is just another disciplinary technique for
transforming sex into discourse and the homosexual into a species with
a particular mode of life. (xxiii)
Homosexuality is and is not choice; is and is not a category into which one
is tbrust. Tbe ideology of sexual liberation so necessary for the liberation
to take place is just one more structure of discourses from which the
individual never escapes, forced as he is then to be an "out" homosexual ,
constrained--Sartre would say "condemned"--to his freedom.
Just as there are two visions of the body in Foucault, an
alternation between the subjected body and the absent body, there are two
visions of homosexuality. One is the froit of constraint, even if that
constraint is named "liberation" and "understanding." Tbe second vision is
one of choice and option, freedom as opposed to liberation. Tbe first
vision depends on a heterocentric point of view, a sustained position that
sees homosexual behavior as an acceptable (or not) variant of a dominant
sexuality. Its main difference from heterosexuality, in fact, its unique
difference from heterosexuality, is in the choice of the anatomy of the
sexual partner. This is certainly the point of view that Eribon adopts for
much of his book, because it is one that seems to reflect a certain strain
in Foucault as an individual.
As a difference, as a variant, however, it is ultimately problematic,
for the possibilities allowed it within the power grid of discourses limit it,
constrain it far more than heterosexuality: . there are far fewer acceptable
modes of presentation, behavior, ostentation for the homosexual individual
than for the heterosexual one. Tbe homosexual individual has society
against hirn or her: even if society allows hirn or her to practice his or her
behavior, accepts it, the acceptance takes place from within the stronghold
of heterosexism. It is an acceptance that tbe heterosexual never has to
face for himself or herself, for he or she is that sexual object defined by
society as ideniical to its dominant vision. When heterosexual discourse
looks in, it sees arefleetion of itself. For alt others, at least for
homosexuals , there is a crisis. The crisis has a name in current gender
studies circles: intemalized homophobia. It used to be called "sensitivity."
Tbe gay individual intemalizes the discourses of dominance and reacts to
them, undergoing a crisis that the straight individual has no part oft So
the gay adolescent or young adult, seeking his or her confirmation, is
panicularly susceptible to such a situation. Eribon (44) mentions
Foucault's homosexuality when he was at the Ecole Normale Superieure:
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ItAnd in fact, when he returns from his frequent nocturnal expeditions in
cruising spots or homosexual bars, Foucault rernains prostrate for hours,
sick, annihilated by shame. It James Miller concurs. For hirn, the
homosexual's life,often as not, is marked by aseries of "self-destructive"
behaviors that are symptoms of the intemalized discourses of control that
have entered the very being of the gay individual who cannot see himself
or herself except as that figure constructed by straight discourse. Miller
(90) writes, for example, of Foueault and his lover that they "balanced their
shared moments of Dionysian abandon through a1cohol and sado-
masochistic eroticism with their shared interest in unity and form."
80th Eribon's Foucault and Mitler's Foucault are figures caught
in a teleology of self-liberation. Miller's figure starts early: "Foueault as
a young man made one small but telling gesture of revenge: in an aet of
self-assertion -- and nominal self-mutilation -- airned directly at the
bullying patriarch, Paul-Michel chopped off his nom du pere, becoming
simply 'Michel Foucault'" (63). As he goes through life,this Foucault,
interested more and more in the discourses of power, seeks simultaneously
to liberate himself from these eonstrictions and structures of power that
imprison him behind a maske For example, as Miller notes, in 1969,
He had changed his physical appearance as well: while living in
Tunisia, he had Daniel Defert shave off a1l of his hair, which left him
with a skull thai gleamed like a spearhead. With his wire-rimmed
glasses and smile of ivory and gold, he now looked faindy sadistic, like
a bullying field marshai: for years, the London Review of Books
would use his familiar image in advenisements ordering its readers to
subscribe. (179)
So Miller's Foucault, involved in a process of self-liberation, exehanges one
mask for another, seeks to find himself, to discover who he is through
pushing the taboos and limits of the discourse that constrains hirn, by
pushing back or crossing the barriers at the edge of experience. Miller (7)
remarks early on that he "was forced to ascribe to Foueault a persistent
and purposeful self, inhabiting one and the same body throughout his
mortal life , more or less consistently accounting for his actions and
attitudes to others as weil as to himself, and understanding his life as a
teleologically structured quest (or, in Freneh, recherche)."
Tbe second vision of homosexuality, one that involves choice,
appears in tbe various interviews Foucault gave relating to homosexuality.
In asense, it also is the other face of Miller's view of Foueault: a Foucault
wbo seeks to enact his own self, who wants zu sich selbst kommen. a
Foucault who recognizes his difference and seeks to bring that difference
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to life and to light. It is that same Foucault with a purpose, but the focus
is changed: it is not a movement of self-liberation, but one of self-
actualization, what Ed Cohen (91) caUs both aspace of possibility and of
creativity. As Kritzman states in his introduction to his volume of Foucault
interviews, "Through his many articles and interviews Foucault supported,
although never quite militantly, the imperatives of the gay movement
which, like other experiences such as drugs and communes, situated the
individual on the threshold of other fonns of consciousness and inscribed
~im in the 'culture of the self' (xxii). Tbe key word is "other."
How so? Tbe two visions of Foucault's concept of homosexuality
seem to fall under the same general category of gay liberation. But there
is a difference, I think, in emphasis, and in consequence. In the first, there
is a process of liberation, of crossing of boundaries, and, ultimately, as we
sball see below, the implicit idea of reacbing limits and crossing them. In
tbe second, tbe empbasis is elsewhere, on a distinct otherness, whose limits
are not at all tbe same as the ones imposed on "sexuality"from the point
of view, from the position of dominant, normalized, vanilla sexuality. As
we shall see, in the second view, S/M behavior is not at all a limit or an
extreme.
In the interviews, given to various journalists and other writers
during the last decade of his life, Foucault provocatively formulates the
concept of a distinct gay subject. In "Friendship as a Way of Life, "
Foucault discusses homosexuality with an interviewer for Gai Pied.
Foucault says:
The problem is not to discover in oneself the tnuh of sex but rather
to use sexuality henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships.
And no doubt that's the real reason why homosexuality is not a fonn
of desire but something desirable. Therefore we have to work at
becoming homosexuals and not be obstinate in recognizing that we are.
The development towards which the problem of homosexuality tends
is Ihe one of friendship. (Live 204)
So the two imperatives, the two views of homosexuality are simultaneously
there. As something desirable, homosexuality is a goal, an object to be
attained; as something that "weare, " it is not homosexuality that is the goal
as such, but the removal of obstinacy, the negation of all the impositions
on the subject, all the constraints that are placed on hirn or her. It is
understandable tbat the two views are linked, for there is no utopia, or
seems to be no utopia, except the envisioned America as pleasure-palace,
where the two worlds do not collide. Yet in order to understand
homosexuality as such, Foucault insists that we think from within it, and
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not merely as we approach it. It is at that point that the separateness of
homosexuality comes through, the multiplicity of difference and the
multiplicity of different desires that are unmarked by the imposition of
heterosexual models and values. As he notes in the same interview on
friendship, "What we must work on, it seems to me, is not so mueh to
liberate our desires but to make ourselves infinitely more susceptible to
pleasure. We must eseape and help others escape the two ready..made
fonnulas of the pure sexual eneounter and the lovers' fusion of identities It
(Live 206).
For Foucault, the problem of homosexuality is not the sexual act
itself, but the possibility that this sexual act is not a self..contained unit, but
something with a eonsequenee: the result being the formation of lines of
order, power, and eommunication distinct from those of society at large:
One of the concessions oße makes to others is not to present
homosexuality as a kind of immediate pleasure, of two young men
meeting in the street, seducing each other with a look, grabbing each
other's asses aod getting each other off in a quarter of an hour. There
you have a kind of neat image of homosexuality without any possibility
of generating unease, and for two reasons: it responds to the
reassuring canon of beauty and it annuls everything that ean be
uncomfortable in affection, tendemess, friendship, fidelity, camaraderie
and companionship, things which our rather sanitized society can't
allow a placc for without fearing thc formation of new alliances and
thc tying togcther of unforeseen lines of force: I think that's what
makes homosexuality "disturbing": the homosexual mode of life much
more than the sexual act itself. (Live 205)
The consequences of this homosexual mode of life are elear: if the sexual
act is not only an isolated, immediate aet (though, of course, it can be),
but some action with consequences for power ~ organization, and
discourses, it stands to reason that even that sexual aet, when found in a
new set of contexts--that of the "homosexual mode of life....-means
something else. In the vulgar sense, the sexual organs and orifiees that
heterosexual discourses define as those of homosexual intercourse are not
the same as those defined by a homosexual power structure. From a
Foucauldian point of view, contextual here as elsewhere~ the penis and a
foniori, the anus, defined by homosexual discourse as the organs of its
sexual aets take on new values and new constraints. For Foueault, this
differenee already makes the penis and the anus ..other.,. They are not the
same sexual organs as they once were, just as, for example, the mad are
not the same as tbey once were~ or the sick, or the condemned, and so
forth.
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It is clear that it is a short step from this position of homosexual
sex to Foucault's concept of S/M. Obviously, Foucault's idea of S/M is
wholly distinct from some pathology of sexuality. If there is an inspiration
it is perhaps Iiterary, but in the most banal sense: the idea of S/M is its
multiplicity and in the control of that multiplicity by the sadistic seIf:
Asked about his interest in Sade in an interview conducted in 1973 entitled
"An Historian of Culture" (Live 82), Foucault says, "It is evident that if I
want to make love (or rather, when I want to make love) I do not resort
to Sade's prescribed methods, to his combinations; not so much because
I wouldn't like to try, but because I've never had the opportunity."
I would say tben that the sadistic seit meeting the sense of
homosexuality that Foucault sees in the freedom (as opposed, once again,
to the act of liberation of some imaginary) finds the extension of gay
sexuality to some multiplicity the most natural consequence:
S & M is not a relationship between he (or she) who suffers and he
(or she) who intlicts suffering, but between the master and the one on
whom he exercises his mastery. Wbat interests the practitioners of S
& M is that the relationship is at the same time regulated and open.
. . . This mixture of rules and opeMess has the effeet of intensifying
sexual relations by introdueing a perpetual novelty, a perpetual tension
and a perpetual uneertainty whieh the simple eonsummation of the aet
lacks. The idea is also to make use of every part of the body as a
sexual instrument. ("Sexual Choiee" 20)
For Foucault then, S/M, sado-masochism is misnamed. It is a question of
two (or more) sadistic subjects, two individuals who both control a sexual
situation. It is as far as possible from the game of dominance and
submission traditionally associated with heterosexual intercourse. For
Foucault, again in the vulgar sense, to take it up the ass is as sadistic a
sexual action as another. Perhaps the most sadistic, for symbolically it is
the enclosure of the organ of power, the capturing of the phallic penis, the
imprisonment of the violent within a 1arger, yet controlIed violence, yet
with no will to reproduce the self in the realm of the imaginary as in
heterosexual coitus.
If we turn then to Miller's vision of Foucault's S/M sexuality, and
his patient explanation of that behavior, we wonder at the limited vision
that this explanation implies. Miller explains in great detail, for example,
the details of S/M behavior. Miller (264-65) gives the list of S/M
techniques as he finds the catch-all "etc.' of Larry Townshend's book The
Lealherman 's Handbook, "the most widely read gay S/M manual," woefully
inadequate: ttgagging, piercing, cutting, hanging, electric-shocking,
stretching on racks, imprisoning, branding, blindfolding, mummifying,
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pissing on, shilling on, shaving, buming, crucifying, suspending, clamping,
suffocating, fist-fucking." Following Geoff Mains in Urban Aboriginals,
Miller (265-67) explains each activity in detail and adds that S/M is not
necessarily a sexual activity whose ultimate goal is orgasm.
But is this Foucault's S/M sexuality? Is it Foucault's sadism? I
'think not. To detail these activities is to give in too easily to a
nomothetically defined sexuality that accepts the definitions of sexual
behavior offered by dominant heterosexual discourse, to see homosexuality,
perhaps as an acceptable variant, but to see S/M as an extreme. No. I
think for Foucault, S/M, .at least as it appears to function for hirn as an
eroticizing of the entire body is the most normal sexuality imaginable. For
it is only in a world that puts logical and discursive chains on a discourse
that sex becomes focused on a discrete set of genitalia, some of which are
acceptable for use when coupled with others, some of which are not. But
why do I say discourse? Because, in the world wherein we all live,
Foucault included, S/M has to be discourse: it cannot go to the logical
conclusion that Sade implies in his text of sacrificing a person for
jouissance, of making a corpse from a corps.
Sade makes (it with) a dead body. Could Foucault, the voices ask,
have gone as far? It is tempting to fall into an easily laid trap and think
that the extreme sexuality that S/M represents to the "normal tt lay reader
means a complete violation of ethical norms, of the human condition, of
the social contract. Violation of one set of norms means perhaps that
others were violated. Listen to Miller's repetition of the innuendoes.
Miller's postscript deals with the rumor that Foucault, in full knowledge
of his being siek with AIDS "had gone to gay bathhouses in America, and
deliberately tried to infect other people with the disease" (375). He
continues, for the explanation seems to make some sense to hirn: "I was
immediately struck by the fact that the stories were leading me to pay
attention to aspects of Foucault's style and historical argument that I had
previously ignored" (376). And then a final hint, rhetorically put: "I now
had to wonder whether the rumor that had gotten me started was closer
to the truth than I had corne to think possible" (381). Yet it concludes
that this was not humanly possible. Foucault could not have knowingly
done this, not because of some philosophical truth about Foucault, but
because Foucault just was not sure if he had AIDS:
Everylhing thaI I bad learned, from Defert and others, persuaded me
that it was highly unlikely that Foucault would (as the rumor depicted
hirn) go around deliberately trying to infect--and hence, in effect,
murder--innocent people. Evidently he had been uncertain, perhaps
to the day he died, whether or not he actually had AIDS. (381)
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To me such a comment, such an exculpation begs the question.
Before Mi1ter, Eribon also put Foucault's knowledge ofbis own illness into
question, only to come down on the side of knowledge: "Foucault knew.
And did not want to know: in his diary, in November, 1983, he noted,
according to Paul Veyne, who was able to read it after Foucault's death:
'I know I have AIDS, but my hysteria permits me to forget it'''(348). For
Eribon, then, going on second hand evidence, Foucault knew he had
AIDS; Miller writing later is not so sure. So Miller ultimately clears
Foucault because the laUer rnay not have known if he had AIDS. Thus,
Foucault could have continued to have the same sexual encounters as he
had previously had, and though sick, ignorant of that fact: he thus could
not have knowingly infected someone else.
All that is weil and good. But what if Eribon is right? What if
Foucault knew he had AIDS? Did he then go around and "murder
innocent people"? Inconceivable, hard to envisage even for amoment,
uoless of course we fall into the same old trap of thinking his sexuality as
an extreme. Yes, he discovered this S/M sexuality over aperiod of time
when he was a mature adult. But no, this S/M sexuality does not imply
abreaking of all the rules. In fact, as I have said, for Foucault, this S/M
sexuality, ultimately occurs in discourses and etiquette (rules of behavior).
It is not translated into a simplistic game of power, whereby the sadist has
a Iife or death control over the imprisoned masochistic other. No, for
Foucault, it is agame for two sadists to play; to cheapen it by turning it
into agame wherein one contro]s the true destiny of tbe other· would be
to repeat the unfortunate structures of power that Foucault had long
sought to combat. To think that Foucault, like some child lashing out,
willinglybrought the others down with hirn, is to forget Foucault's lessons,
Foucault's thought, Foucault's beliefs from one end of his writing to
another. Foucault may very weil have been the "postmodemist sphinx" that
Miller (320) believes hirn to be, but he was a sphinx always already faced
with Oedipus, two sadists caught in a dance and game played among
friends:
Homosexuality is an historie occasion to re-open affective and
relational virtualities. not so much through the intrinsie qualities of the
homosexual , but due to the biases against the position he occupies; in
a certain sense diagonal lines that he ean traee in the social fabrie
pennit him to make these virtualities visible. (live 207)
Of course, as Miller says, one can never say for sure. But I would add:
"of the man Foucault." Of the philosopher, I think that we can be certain
that he did not willingly kill tbe object he loved.
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